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ther judicial or legislative guidance is necessary to define the ability of tenants to transfer the right to make such purchases. It is
suggested, however, that future guidelines should not restrict
transferability to an extent which might discourage home ownership and the societal benefits which flow therefrom,2 5 but rather,
should regulate to the degree necessary to resolve the disputes
which will undoubtedly arise as both tenants and sponsors struggle
to devise more creative means of promoting their respective interests in the transferability issue.
Daniel J. Baurkot

CPL § 190.25(4); The disclosure of grandjury testimony in a subsequent civil action
Since the fourteenth century, grand jury proceedings have
been held in secret.1 In New York, this practice has been codified
469 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985)(executor had both right and duty to purchase unit for
deceased tenant's estate); Hohenstein v. Hohenstein, 127 Misc. 2d 53, 56, 485 N.Y.S.2d 170,
172 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984)(husband remained "tenant in occupancy" and was entitled to purchase at insider price after separation from wife even though he could not physically occupy apartment until her death).
25 See Ch.555, § 1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 2396. "[T]he conversion of residential real estate
from rental status to cooperative or condominium ownership is an effective method of preserving, stabilizing and improving neighborhoods and the supply of sound housing accommodations." Id.; see Rohan, "The Model Condominium Code" - A Blueprintfor Modernizing Condominium Legislation, 78 COLUM L. Rav. 587, 599 (1978)("occupier-ownership in
the form of ... condominiums offers the best long-range solution to the problem of urban
decay").
The condominium form of ownership may provide a lower-income family with its only
opportunity to purchase a unit having the same characteristics as the "traditional singlefamily detached house." Id. In addition to the tax advantages and the ability to share in the
management of the condominium, such families would gain a sense of pride and fulfillment
in being the owners of the apartment. Id. This pride of ownership cannot exist without the
right to profits. Id. at 133.

, See M. FRANKEL & G. NATALus, THE GRAN JuRY 9 (1977). The grand jury dates back
to 1166 when King Henry II formed the Assize of Clarendon to serve as an investigatory and
law enforcement body. See id. at 6-7. The hearing of testimony in private became a practice
of the grand jury during the fourteenth century. See id. at 9. It was not until some 200 years
later, however, that the grand jury broadened its role to include the protection of the innocent from unfounded accusation. See id.
The five most frequently cited reasons for maintaining grand jury confidentiality are:
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in CPL section 190.25,2 which proscribes the disclosure of "the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony" except "upon written order of the court."'3 The New York Court of Appeals has held
that a trial court may direct the disclosure of grand jury testimony4 upon an initial showing by the moving party of a "compelling and particularized need," 5 and if in its discretion, the court
(1) prevention of flight by a defendant who is about to be indicted; (2) protection of the grand jurors from interference from those under investigation; (3) prevention of subornation of perjury and tampering with prospective witnesses at the
trial to be held as a result of any indictment the grand jury returns; (4) protection
of an innocent accused from unfounded accusations if in fact no indictment is
returned; and (5) assurance to prospective witnesses that their testimony will be
kept secret so they will be willing to testify freely.
People v. Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d 229, 235, 265 N.E.2d 449, 452, 316 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625-26
(1970) (citations omitted). These aims were first stated in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d
617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954) and later cited by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958). See Note, The Use of
Grand Jury Transcriptsin Private Antitrust Litigation: An Argument for Automatic Access, 58 Tax. L. REv. 647, 650-51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Use of Grand Jury
Transcripts].
The grand jury's traditional functions include the investigation of crime, see People v.
Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394, 402 N.E.2d 1140, 1142-43, 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (1980),
and the protection of citizens from unfounded prosecution through its power to decide
whether to issue indictments, see United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983);
Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials to Foreign Authorities Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e), 70 VA. L. REv. 1623, 1626 (1984).
2 See CPL § 190.25(4) (McKinney 1982). Section 190.25(4) provides in pertinent part:
Grand Jury proceedings are secret, and no grand juror, or other person... may, except
in the lawful discharge of his duties or upon written order of the court, disclose the nature
or substance of any grand jury testimony, . . . or other matter attending a grand jury
proceeding.
Id.
3 CPL § 190.25(4) (McKinney 1982). See also Larry W. v. Corporation Counsel, 55
N.Y.2d 244, 251, 433 N.E.2d 517, 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 452, 456 (1982) (fundamental policy of
secrecy can only be breached when authorized by statute or court). Section 325(1) of the
Judiciary Law also directs the grand jury stenographer to provide the district attorney with
a transcript of all testimony, "but he shall not permit any other person to take a copy...
nor to read ... except upon the written order of the court duly made after hearing the said
district attorney. ... " N.Y. JUD. LAW § 325(1) (McKinney 1983).
4 See In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 448 N.E.2d 440, 443-44, 461 N.Y.S.2d
773, 776-77 (1983); People v. Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d 229, 234, 265 N.E.2d 449, 451, 316
N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (1970).
5 See In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 448 N.E.2d 440, 444, 461 N.Y.S.2d
773, 776-77 (1983). In re District Attorney involved a civil 'RICO' suit brought by the district attorney on behalf of the county to recover damages from political figures and businessmen who allegedly defrauded Suffolk County. See id. at 440, 448 N.E.2d at 441-42, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 774-75. The Court of Appeals vacated an ex parte order obtained by the district
attorney which had authorized the use of testimony given before the grand jury that had
investigated the fraud. See id. at 440-41, 448 N.E.2d at 441-442, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
The Court of Appeals held that grand jury secrecy is not absolute and that a trial court,
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determines that "the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests in secrecy." 6 Recently, in Melendez v. City of New York,
the Appellate Division, First Department applied this standard in
a civil action in which private litigants sought disclosure of grand
jury testimony, and held that the movants had failed to establish
the requisite "compelling and particularized need" to warrant pretrial disclosure of a third party's grand jury testimony.8 The court,
however, ruled that disclosure of the plaintiffs' own grand jury tesin its discretion, may grant disclosure when it would promote a public interest that outweighs the strong interests in secrecy. Id. at 444, 448 N.E.2d at 443-44, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 77677. The court further stated that "one seeking disclosure first must demonstrate a compelling and particularized need for access." See id.
The In re District Attorney court indicated that to the extent that disclosure is not
essential to establish a prima facie case, the "compelling and particularized need" standard
is not met. See id. at 445-46, 448 N.E.2d at 444-45, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78. In addition, if
application for disclosure is not narrowly drawn to minimize encroachment on grand jury
secrecy, the standard is also not met. See id. at 445, 448 N.E.2d at 445, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 778;
see also Note, Preserving Grand Jury Secrecy: United States v. Baggot, 16 CONN. L. REV.
371, 373 (1984) (disclosure should be limited to extent justified by movant's need). The
mere fact that grand jury testimony was shown to be useful and relevant was held insufficient by the Supreme Court to satisfy this standard. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Note, The Use of Grand Jury Transcripts, supra note 1, at 649.
One author has argued that the "compelling and particularized need" test does not
adequately protect the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See Note, The Use of GrandJury
Transcripts,supra note 1, at 651 (commentator suggests that test actually may inhibit witnesses from testifying freely before the grand jury because they can never be sure when a
compelling need for their testimony might arise).
6 See In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d at 444, 448 N.E.2d at 443-44, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
776. The petitioner must show a "compelling and particularized need" before the court will
balance the interests in disclosure against the interest in secrecy. See id. at 448 N.E.2d at
443-44, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 776. This balancing test originated in People v. Di Napoli, 27
N.Y.2d 229, 234, 265 N.E.2d 449, 451, 316 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (1970). In granting disclosure
of grand jury minutes to the Public Service Commission for use in a hearing involving alleged utility overcharges, the court stated that there was a strong public interest in disclosure since the Commission could use the information to prevent similar victimization of consumers in the future. Id. at 235, 265 N.E.2d at 452, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 628. The court based its
decision to grant disclosure on three factors: the character of the litigant seeking disclosure,
the nature of the inquiry, and the fact that the grand jury had completed its investigation
and those indicted had pleaded guilty and paid their fines. See id. at 238, 265 N.E.2d at 454,
316 N.Y.S.2d at 628. For additional cases in which the courts have found a public interest in
disclosure, see In re Scotti, 53 App. Div. 2d 282, 288-89, 385 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663-64 (4th Dep't
1976) (disclosure to superintendent of state police and Commissioner of Department of Corrections for considering disciplinary action against officers); People v. Werfel, 82 Misc. 2d
1029, 372 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975) (investigation of judicial nominee).
But see Zinna v. Rensselaer County Grand Jury, 63 App. Div. 2d 800, 801, 404 N.Y.S.2d
1015, 1016 (3d Dep't 1978) (mem.) (no compelling public interest when defendant in civil
action for malicious prosecution sought grand jury minutes to prepare for trial).
109 App. Div. 2d 13, 489 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1st Dep't 1985).
8 Id. at 19, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
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timony was proper when it had a bearing on the issues in the civil
litigation."
In Melendez, the plaintiffs, Hector Melendez and his family,
sued the city of New York for damages arising from injuries sustained by Mr. Melendez after he was shot by a police officer during
an arrest. 10 The district attorney's office investigated the incident
and presented the matter to a grand jury, which neither indicted
Melendez nor took any action against the officer." After the dismissal of the criminal charges against Melendez, the plaintiffs
moved to compel disclosure of the grand jury testimony of
Melendez, his wife, and the arresting officer. 2 The district attorney
cross-moved for a protective order,' alleging that the public interest in grand jury secrecy outweighed the litigants' private interest
in disclosure.' 4 Special Term granted the plaintiffs' motion in full
without discussing the issues involved.'
On appeal, the First Department modified the lower court's
order by denying disclosure of the police officer's grand jury testimony and affirming the disclosure of the plaintiffs' own testimony.'8 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kassal held that
the plaintiffs' conclusory assertions that the officer's testimony was
• Id. at 22, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
10 Id. at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743. The plaintiffs did not sue the officer but charged the
city with negligence in the hiring, training and retention of the officer, and with excessive
force and negligence in connection with the shooting. Id. at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
12 Id. at 14-15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743. The officer testified at the grand jury under a
waiver of immunity. Id.
1 Id. at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743. The plaintiffs in Melendez were joined in the motion
by the defendant city. Id. The plaintiffs argued that there were no longer any interests in
secrecy because no indictments were returned and that they were unable to conduct adequate discovery because the officer had invoked his privilege against self incrimination during the pre-trial examination. Id.
11 109 App. Div. 2d at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743; see CPLR § 3103(a) (McKinney
1983)("court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or witness,
make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device.").
14109 App. Div. 2d at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743. The district attorney also argued that
disclosure would have a "chilling effect" on future grand jury probes and that disclosure
could only be obtained during the trial for the impeachment of witnesses or to refresh recollection. Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 23, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49. The Melendez court also denied the disclosure of a
tape recorded statement of the arresting officer which had been given to the district attorney in the course of his investigation, holding that it was protected by the 'public interest'
privilege. Id. at 21, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The court explained that this privilege was qualified, and that the statement could be disclosed upon a balancing of the interest in disclosure
against the public interest in secrecy. Id.

19861

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

useful for trial preparation and impeachment purposes failed to
satisfy the "compelling and particularized need" standard, thus
precluding the exercise of judicial balancing. 1 7 The court noted
that disclosing this testimony would compromise the guarantee of
secrecy given to witnesses and would thereby impair the ability of
future grand juries to obtain witnesses willing to testify freely.' 8
However, the court maintained that the need for confidentiality
did not bar disclosure of the plaintiffs' own testimony.1 9
It is submitted that the Melendez court correctly applied the
established standard for disclosure of a third party's grand jury
testimony in a subsequent civil action. Mere conclusory assertions
that the testimony would be useful for trial preparation do not sat20
isfy the "compelling and particularized need" prong of this test.
A party will only satisfy this requirement if he or she can demonstrate that it will be impossible to establish a prima facie case
without the third party's testimony.21 Even if this prong is met,
" See 109 App. Div. 2d at 20, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The Melendez court held that if the
moving party failed to make the initial showing of compelling and particularized need, the
court could not exercise its discretion by balancing the competing interests. See id. at 20,
489 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (citing In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 448 N.E.2d 440, 444,
461 N.Y.S.2d 773, 777 (1983)). The court held that the motion for disclosure could be renewed before the trial court if the officer's testimony and statements to the district attorney
were needed for impeachment purposes or to refresh a witnesses' recollection. Id. at 20, 489
N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. Accord People v. Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d 229, 237, 265 N.E.2d 449, 453,
316 N.Y.S.2d 622, 627 (1970) (limited disclosure for impeachment purposes proper).
'0 109 App. Div. 2d at 21, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The court noted several other factors
that militated against the disclosure of the officer's testimony. First, the disclosure was
sought by a private litigant for his own personal interests. 109 App. Div. 2d at 20, 489
N.Y.S.2d at 747. Second, the police officer had not authorized the production of his testimony. Id. at 22, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Finally, nondisclosure did not prevent the plaintiffs
from establishing a prima facie case because other witnesses to the incident were available,
and the disclosure devices of CPLR article 31 provided an "ample remedy." Id. at 21, 489
N.Y.S.2d at 748.
1' 109 App. Div. 2d at 22, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748. In support of disclosing the plaintiffs'
own testimony, the court cited CPL § 190.25(4), which provides that a witness may disclose
his own testimony, and CPLR 3101(e), which permits a party in a civil action to obtain a
copy of his statement. Id. Finally, the court gave significant weight to the fact that the
grand jury proceeding had ended without an indictment. Id.
20 See In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d at 445, 448 N.E.2d at 445, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 778
(1983) (general allegations leave trial court without requisite tools to minimize invasion into
grand jury); Ruggiero v. Fahey, 103 App. Div. 2d 65, 70-71, 478 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341 (2d Dep't
1984) (strong presumption of confidentiality not overcome by conclusory assertions of need).
See generally supra note 5 (discussing compelling and particularized need prong).
21 See Melendez, 109 App. Div. 2d at 21, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The court stated that
"[i]t does not appear that plaintiffs are in any way precluded from making out a prima facie
case.. ." Id. Similarly, in In re District Attorney, in denying the motion for disclosure, the
court noted that a shortfall in the motion existed because the District Attorney had failed to
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however, it is unlikely that disclosure will be granted to a private
litigant in a civil action because a private litigant rarely demonstrates a public interest in disclosure that is strong enough to overcome the interest in secrecy.2 2
Finally, it is submitted that the Melendez court erred in releasing the transcript of the plaintiffs' own grand jury testimony
without requiring the plaintiffs to meet the standards set forth by
the Court of Appeals. Because protection of the officer's reputation
represented a substantial interest in secrecy, 23 the plaintiffs should
not have been entitled to a transcript of their own testimony based
solely upon the conclusory assertion that it would be useful in their
subsequent civil action.24 Such a disclosure compromises the inheridentify "what made it impossible for [him] to establish his case without resort to the minutes." 58 N.Y.2d at 446, 448 N.E.2d at 445, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78. Cf. In re Buffalo, 57
App. Div. 2d 47, 51, 394 N.Y.S.2d 919, 922-23 (4th Dep't 1977) (no showing that other
sources were inadequate to provide movant with information sought); Ruggiero v. Fahey,
103 App. Div. 2d 65, 70, 461 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341 (2d Dep't 1984) (no showing that liberal
discovery devices would be insufficient or unavailing).
22 See supra note 6 (discussion of balancing test). The Melendez court stated that a
"factor which militates against disclosure ... is that relief is sought by private litigants to
promote their own personal interests." 109 App. Div. 2d at 20, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 747. Private
litigants are almost uniformly denied disclosure for trial preparation purposes. See In re
U.S. Air, 97 App. Div. 2d 961, 469 N.Y.S.2d 39 (4th Dep't 1983) (mei.) People v. Judge, 88
App. Div. 2d 789, 789, 451 N.Y.S.2d 537, 537 (4th Dep't 1982) (mem.); In re Buffalo, 57
App. Div. 2d 47, 50, 394 N.Y.S.2d 919, 922 (4th Dep't 1977).
While the Court of Appeals has never defined what is meant by a "public interest," it
has referred to three factual situations in which it would find a "public interest in disclosure." See In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d at 445, 448 N.E.2d at 44, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 777
(public interest found in "county's efforts to recover damages from those who allegedly defrauded taxpayers"); Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d at 235, 265 N.E.2d at 444, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 625
(public interest best served by disclosure in case involving fraud against customers); In re
Buffalo, 57 App. Div. 2d at 48, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (court held that public interest in city's
investigation of municipal "no show" job scandal did not outweigh secrecy where no need
was shown) (cited by Court of Appeals in In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d at 444, 448
N.E.2d at 444, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 777). For other courts which have found a public interest in
disclosure, see supra note 6.
23 See supra note 1 for discussion of interests served by secrecy. Since the police officer
was investigated but not indicted, see 109 App. Div. 2d at 15, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 743, the
interest in the "protection of an innocent accused from unfounded accusations" exists. See
id. at 17, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
24 See 109 App. Div. 2d at 22, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The Melendez court based it decision to disclose plaintiffs' own testimony on two factors: first, the grand jury had closed with
no indictments. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has noted that the interests in secrecy are
only diminished, not eliminated, when the grand jury has ended its activities. See Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). Secondly, Melendez recognized
that § 190.25(4), discussed supra note 2, codified the common law rule allowing a witness to
disclose his own testimony. See 109 App. Div. 2d at 22, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748; People v.
Naughton, 38 How. Pr. 430, 440 (1870). The Court of Appeals, while recognizing this rule,
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ent secrecy of the proceedings since the right of a witness to disclose his own testimony is not the same as the right to a transcript
of that testimony.2 5
In conclusion, the court in Melendez recognized the utmost
importance of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Although the
court properly applied this principle to the request for the disclosure of a third party's testimony, it erroneously disregarded the
need for secrecy when it failed to require the same compelling and
particularized need from the party seeking a transcript of his own
testimony.
John F. Curran, Jr.

commented that insofar as this disclosure is permitted, the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is diminished. See People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 326, 73 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1947). In
addition, the Court of Appeals has recently stated that "the rule of secrecy applies equally
to either one who gives evidence or to one concerning whom evidence is given." In re District Attorney, 58 N.Y.2d at 443, 448 N.E.2d at 443, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (holding that persons discussed in evidence have standing to object to disclosure).
25 See Kinsella v. Andreoli, 95 Misc. 2d 915, 922, 408 N.Y.S.2d 717, 722 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1978). In addressing the issue of whether a witness may obtain transcripts of
his own grand jury testimony, the Kinsella court denied the movant's request for a transcript of his own testimony, holding that disclosure would "[lead] to the inescapable and
inevitable conclusion that grand jury proceedings are not, in fact, secret." Id.
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a witness to disclose his
own testimony, but the majority of federal courts require witnesses to show a particularized
need before obtaining a transcript of their own testimony. 18 U.S.C § 6(e) (Supp. 1985). See,
e.g., Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1976) (strong policy in secrecy and
independence of grand jury served only by showing of particularized need); Valenti v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 230 (E.D.La 1980) ("integrity and efficacy of
grand jury is maintained only by allowing disclosure upon showing of demonstrable need").
But see In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 571 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (since witness may disclose testimony, availability of transcripts does not affect grand jury functions).
The federal courts that have granted transcript requests base their decisions on the fact
that witnesses are free to disclose their testimony. See In re Ferris, 512 F. Supp. 91, 92 (D.
Nev. 1981). The Fourth Circuit in Bast, however, pointed out that this argument "leaves
unanswered the Pandora's box of problems necessarily arising from the sale or delivery of
such transcript to anyone should the witness be able to acquire it on demand." 542 F.2d at
896 n.3.
Therefore, it is submitted that where interests in secrecy remain, the party seeking disclosure must satisfy the tests set forth by the Court of Appeals. Where the interests in
secrecy are diminished, however, the party seeking disclosure should have a lesser burden.
See Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 223.

